“Virtue can only flourish among equals”

Mary Wollstonecraft

Brief Background on Wollstonecraft:

Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-1797) was a British writer, philosopher, and women’s rights activist. Although she is best known for her groundbreaking work, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (from which this quote is taken), she also authored several other works including A Vindication of the Rights of Men, where she critiqued the French revolution, and Maria: or, The Wrongs of Woman, which further addressed gender inequality. Her works remains relevant to ongoing feminist discussion and debate today.

Equality and Virtue

Invariably, Wollstonecraft’s insightfulness never ceases to amaze me. I recently came across this quote from a passage of A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, and while its meaning appears deceptively simple, I’m still chewing on possible interpretations. I’ve decided to write a brief post that serves as a compilation of my unfiltered thoughts and musings regarding this quote, but I’d like to caution that what I’m writing are fragments of ideas, not a comprehensive exploration of any fundamental concept(s). I hope that these fragments allow for broader contemplation as a whole.

Mary Wollstonecraft by John Opie, c. 1797.

The first question that pops up is what constitutes equality in this context. How are two people considered equals? Equality does not depend on two things being considered identical, but rather rests on the presumption of tertium comparationis– the idea that the two items being compared have some common attribute that is the basis of the comparison. In this case, the common attribute for “equality” is something that allows for virtuous behavior among people. Without this common attribute, whatever it may be, one is neither virtuous nor equal. But what this common attribute is depends on how one defines virtue-

In Book II Chapter IV of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, he posits the following stipulations for virtuous behavior. 

1. The virtuous agent must be aware of what they are doing and understand that it is a good thing to do
2. The action must be chosen deliberately for its own sake
3. The virtuous agent must have a fixed moral disposition

Temporarily leaving aside the third stipulation for now, both the first and the second deal with the faculty of reasoning. In other words, virtue cannot be an accident, and Rousseau goes further and holds that something chosen based on instinct does not constitute genuine morality. One must deliberately and consciously choose their course of action with the understanding of its goodness, and so virtue necessarily involves choice. Likewise, a virtuous society must allow for equality with regards to the common attributes of choice and reasoning.  If one is not allowed to utilize their ability to reason or to exercise their autonomous rights, Wollstonecraft holds that they cannot be virtuous because they cannot deliberately choose a course of action. She suggests that inequality implies a dominator and a dominated, with the dominated unable to be truly virtuous because their ability to choose freely has been inhibited. In a similar line of reasoning, many philosophers hold that animals or even children do not have an equal capacity for morality. 

“The Thinker” by Auguste Rodin. Often interpreted as a symbol of human thought, introspection, and the power of thought, which many philosophers have held as an antecedent to virtue.

In reference to Wollstonecraft’s overarching argument that focused on the moral development of women, she contends that the societal inhibition of women’s education and intellectual growth has led to women becoming less virtuous, since they are “told from their infancy, and taught by the example of their mothers, that a little knowledge of human weakness, justly termed cunning, softness of temper, OUTWARD obedience, and a scrupulous attention to a puerile kind of propriety, will abstain for them the protection of man.” Again, we can see that in an unequal society, Wollstonecraft believes virtue is destroyed, since women cultivate dependent attributes that secure necessary protection rather than cultivating reason that would develop virtuous behavior, as they are left with little choice under a patriarchal structure. 

Incidentally, this idea of the destruction of virtue under a patriarchal structure reminded me of Thomas Hardy’s Tess of the D’Urbervilles. While Hardy portrays Tess, the main character, as a “pure woman,” I remember personally finding her to be lacking in sense (though by no fault of her own), arguably a prerequisite for virtue. At times, I felt Tess was highly dependent on her partner, Angel, for what she believed was good and right. She “blindly reverenced him, feeling that he was blameless in thought, word, and deed,” and regarded Angel with idol-like worship. Whatever Angel believed was good, she did too. Whatever Angel believed was bad, she did too. Can such a woman truly be categorized as “pure?” By no means bad or evil, it is nevertheless difficult to prescribe morality to a character written as dependent and unequal. In all fairness, one of the few moments where I felt Tess had a true moral backbone was when she points out in rightful indignation Angel’s hypocrisy in not forgiving her for her “sin” after he confesses his sin to her. For those who have read the book (*spoiler alert*), it is interesting to note that after Tess kills Alec, she tells Angel that she had to kill him because he wronged Angel. To return to Wollstonecraft’s quote, the unequal power dynamic between Tess and Angel harms her moral growth, since she simultaneously grows more and more fanatically in love with Angel and shifts her moral views to align with his. This is not to fault Tess for not maintaining her own moral beliefs, but rather to highlight Wollstonecraft’s argument that people cannot develop virtue unless they are held in equal regard. And of course, the ultimate perpetrators were Angel and Alec, under the backdrop of the patriarchal, Victorian era. 

Photo of Gemma Arterton playing Tess in  a TV adaptation of Tess of the D’Urbervilles.

Wollstonecraft’s notion of inequality, as we have stated before, appears to have a dominator and a dominated. We have focused heavily on the development of virtue in the dominated, but that is only one side of the coin when it comes to the the idea that “virtue can only flourish among equals.” What about the virtue of those who dominate? I’d like to refer to Kant’s belief in respecting each individual’s autonomy. A central component of Kant’s ethical theory is the idea that all people ought to be respected by virtue of being people who can think rationally and act autonomously. The subjugation of any class of people (in this particular case, women), is a violation of people’s right to have their autonomy respected. This particular principle, although debatable, is fairly easy to understand intuitively; all people are inherently entitled to respect as independent beings, so disrespecting people’s humanity is immoral. As a brief aside, I’d like to note the irony in Kant’s respect principle. Referring to women, he once stated, “They do something only because they love to, and the art lies in making sure they love only what is good. I hardly believe the fair sex is capable of principles.” While Kant clearly didn’t intend for his moral principles to extend to women, Wollstonecraft’s arguments and indirect extension of his principle emphasizes how unless human respect is given equally to all people, virtue is lost. Interestingly, Kant’s friend Theodor Gottlieb von Hippel argued for women’s equality and related it to the idea of unalienable rights, arguing that “the female sex lost its human rights through no fault of its own.” This relates to Wollstonecraft’s belief that virtue must be predicated on equality, because human rights are immorally denied with female subjugation.

Virtue depends on equal treatment, and therefore there are two extremes that can threaten virtue: disrespect and idolization. While the latter is not necessarily the case for the dominated, the former is very frequently the case for the dominator. When one is considered unequal, people naturally disrespect them, even if only subconsciously. This may not only be an impediment to virtue, but a vice in and of itself- one of the most prominent ideas in Aristotle’s Ethics is that virtue exists in a state of moderation that lies between the extremes of excess and deficiency. For example, he states that someone who flees from every danger is a coward and someone who does not flee from anything as rash; courage is thus somewhere in between these two extremities. In this case, “equality” represents moderation in how we view and treat others, and thus unwarranted disrespect and unwarranted idolization are vices of extremity. Wollstonecraft’s reference to equality could take on many interpretations, from that of moderation to (as we’ve discussed earlier) a sense of respect for individual autonomy, to the sexes having comparable reasoning ability. Regardless, it is a testament to her respect for human dignity.

Let us end by briefly shifting the focus away from equality, and focus on what is actually the main subject of Wollstonecraft’s quote- virtue. Her wording is particularly interesting; instead of saying something along the lines of, “virtue and equality are intertwined,” she says, “virtue can only flourish among equals.” Instead of equality being the ultimate aim, her quote suggests that equality is a means to a higher end, with virtue being the end goal. The prepositional phrase “among equals” provides more information about where virtue can flourish, and the importance of equality is thus only understood in relation to its impact on virtue. Wollstonecraft sees virtue as something fundamental and foundational, something that is essential to leading a meaningful and fulfilling life. While it may be impossible to define what “virtue’ is, I will go out on a limb and say that Wollstonecraft led us a little closer to understanding it and its connection to equality.

Mary Wollstonecraft tribute sculpture by Maggie Hambling. Ionana Marinescu.